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ABSTRACT   How  might  a  posthumanist  notion  of  ecological  community  attempt  to  address  questions 
concerning  extinction?  Such  irredeemable  losses  are  explicated  through  four  aspects  of 
ecological/community  relations—material  manifestation  (appearances),  material  involvement  (effects), 
semiotic  resonance  (meanings)  and  phenomenological  experiences—that  together  constitute  a  broader 
understanding  of  ecological  community  that  does  not  exempt humans  from  ecological  effects  or  except 
ecology from ethical and political concerns. This ecological approach is further developed in the light of 
Jacob von Uexküll’s phenomenological biology and Jean-Luc Nancy’s concepts of being singular plural and 
the sense of the world. 
 
 
 
Extinction is Eternal, as an Individual’s Death is Eternal 
The dead no longer walk or appear among the living as they once did; the worldly possibilities 
resident in their singular being are lost or dispersed; their significance is exposed to the whims 
of memory and history; the experiential opening onto the world that was theirs, and theirs 
alone, is extinguished; their constitutive, yet hardly fathomed, roles in the wider community 
fall empty. This is not to say that life will not go on, that different possibilities will not arise, 
that  the  world  will  cease  to  be  made  meaningful  to,  or  experienced  by,  others,  or  that 
community necessarily collapses, but to notice an irredeemable loss, a loss that even eternity 
cannot  rectify.  The  extinct  too,  like  the  dead,  have  passed  their  earthly  time,  they  can  no 
longer “be-here”, they are no longer within our reach and touch. And whether speaking of a 
singular death or a specific extinction, these lives are ethically and quite literally irreplaceable, 
nothing will ever take their place in the world.  
Extinction, of course, involves the death of singular beings, the last Great Auk shot by a 
trophy hunter, the last passenger pigeon in a cage in Cincinnati Zoo, but it is also a specific 
kind of death: It is both a species of death and a death that concerns (in all the senses just 
mentioned) a species of beings.
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1 The term species, as used here, entails no biological essentialism but simply recognises a series of more or less 
closely knit family resemblances, behaviours, etc. across and between individual members of a reproductively 
isolated population with common lineage that serve to distinguish that population from others. Where such 22 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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1) The loss of a species of appearances in the world—of the innumerable ways in which beings 
become  materially  manifest  in  the  world  such  that  others  sense  their  presence,  whether 
through smelling, seeing, hearing, tasting (but also all the other senses that humans have no 
inkling  of).  We  might,  for  example,  think  of  touching  and  being  touched  by  others  where 
“being touched by” may have both the connotation of contact, of something communicated, 
and/or of being emotionally touched or affected, i.e. of a presence felt at the surfaces and/or in 
the depths of different beings.  
 
2) The loss of a species of creative involvements in the world—of their unique contributions to 
and  effects  upon  others  and  of  the  material  possibilities  offered  through  their  worldly 
interventions,  whether  or  not  others  sense  these  involvements.  The  material  effects  of 
extinction can reverberate beneath the surfaces of the world like an earthquake’s seismic after-
shocks.   
 
3)  The loss of a species of significance for the world—for  everything  that  appears a n d  h a s  
effects carries with it various semiotic possibilities, different ways of becoming meaningful for 
different  beings  according  to  their  particular  modes  of  existence.  Extinction  then  is  a 
curtailment  of  that  species’  (bio)semiotic  potential,  where  biosemiosis  is  understood  as  the 
production and communication of “significance” in a very broad sense, one far from being 
limited to any thing’s meaning for human beings.
2   
 
4)  The loss of a species of openness on the world—of  phenomenological  experiences  of  a 
sensed world. For in many, and perhaps all, cases where we want to speak of death and/or 
extinction, those beings themselves experienced and sensed the world in certain, albeit very 
different, ways. Extinction entails a loss of a (relatively particular) mode of such experience, for 
example, of the dodo’s mode of experiencing the ecology of Mauritius. 
 
5) The loss of a species constitutive of ecological community—where ecological community 
might be understood in terms of the combination and sharing of all these senses (appearance, 
effect, meaning, phenomena) of the relations between all of these and all other things that 
together compose the world.
3  
 
Though  each  of  these  aspects  of  ecological/community  relations  (appearances,  effects, 
meanings, experiences) can be thought of singularly they are materially inseparable (as they are 
for any individual life/death), so when we think of one we should consider all the other senses 
along with it. The senses in which they appeared to (were present in such a way as to be 
sensed by) others, the sense in which they effected the world (made things happen), their sense 
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distinctions are impossible then we are unlikely to be speaking of either species or their extinction, but might still 
want to speak of the extinction of populations, strains, etc. For a variety of perspectives on the ontological status of 
species see Robert A. Wilson, Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1999). 
2 Thomas A. Seboek, Global Semiotics (Bloomington and Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 2001); Marcello 
Barbieri, ed., Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008); Jesper 
Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs (Scranton: University of 
Scranton Press, 2008); Dario Martinelli, A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics: People, Paths, Ideas (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2008). 
3 Which is obviously rather different from the way ecological community is usually understood—see below. Smith, Ecological Community / 23 
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(meaning and significance) for others, the ways they themselves sensed (experienced) the world, 
the senses in which they constituted a community. That is, to borrow and ecologically adapt 
Nancy’s  phrase,  we  need  to  consider  how  “the  sense  of  the  world”
4 is  effected  (created, 
brought about) and affected (changed, touched). These aspects of community can only make 
sense (things can only appear, only have effects, only be meaningful, only be experienced) in 
conjunction with each other and in terms of the creation and sharing of a world between 
beings  (a  world  of  appearances  and e f f e c t s  and m e a n i n g s  and e x p e r i e n c e s ) .  T h i s  c r e a t i v e  
sharing  (the  nature  of  which  has  yet  to  be  unfurled)  is  how  an  ecological  community  is 
(relationally)  constituted,  and  a  loss  to  this  world  alters  the  constitution  of  this  community 
irrevocably. 
These senses are obviously gathered together when we consider an individual’s death, 
especially the death of someone close. In terms of their (dis)appearance we miss the tangible 
evidence of their presence, looking expectantly for them in their accustomed places, catching 
scents  that  re-open  memories,  feeling  only  a  void  where  once  we  held  them t i g h t .  T h e  
deceased’s effects are in no sense limited to the possessions they left behind (a car, a dog 
leash). They are much more elusive, intangible, and powerful. We notice things previously 
taken for granted but now left undone, hear tell of their involvement in events and in other’s 
lives of which we were ignorant. The impact of their lives and their actions is impossible to 
fully grasp. We can only speculate what might have occurred had they lived differently, or 
longer, or not at all. The significance of their lives too is thrown into relief and re-interpreted. 
We  gather  something  of  the  different  meanings  others  attributed  to  the  deceased,  each 
according to their own history and concerns.
5 Then, of course, we remember how we heard 
tell of experiences they once had as a child or adult, the sights seen, the feelings felt, their 
happiness and anxieties. Sometimes we are drawn to imagine their final moments just before 
their phenomenal world faded for ever. And as we think about these relations and the roles 
they occupied we realise that there is actually no way of ever summing up the constitutive 
roles they played in sustaining and/or transforming the community of which they formed a 
part.
6 We are bereft.   
How much more difficult is it to think about the extinction of a species, especially one 
very different to and distant from our own? Such beings may have appeared to us in very 
limited ways —many have certainly gone extinct without our having sensed them at all. We 
may know little or nothing of their activities and effects. Their significance to us may seem 
almost negligible— just a Latin name in a book. We will probably have never considered their 
phenomenal worlds at all. How then can we even begin to consider or evaluate their loss in 
terms of ecological community?  
Such  difficulties  are  compounded  by  various  (predominant)  forms  of  human 
exemptionalism and exceptionalism that allow little or no space for considering other species 
as parts of the same community as ourselves at all. Exemptionalism treats ecology and human 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). I develop a more 
explicit and complete analysis of the ecological potential of Nancy’s work in Mick Smith, “Epharmosis: Jean-Luc 
Nancy and the Political Oecology of Creation,” Environmental Ethics 32, no. 4 (2010): 385-404.  
5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1998). 
6 Think of how it took an angel to show George Bailey the import of his life to the people of Bedford Falls in Frank 
Capra’s classic film It’s a Wonderful Life (MGM, 1947). 24 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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community as entirely distinct realms, it considers humans as being(s) outside and/or above 
(exempt from) any ecological considerations.
7 Exceptionalism, whether religious or humanist,
8 
regards human communities as distinguished by an ethics and/or politics in which no beings 
other  than  humans  can  possibly  participate.  Insofar  as  forms  of  exemptionalism  and 
exceptionalism assume (as they usually do) that only what matters to humans matters at all 
(ecologically, ethically, and politically) they contribute directly to the ways in which species 
deemed not to matter are forced towards extinction.  
 
Now environmentalists challenge exemptionalism and/or exceptionalism in various ways, and 
do so precisely on the basis of what matters. They remind us that “what appears to human 
beings is not all that appears, that what affects human beings directly is not all that has effects, 
that  what  has  significance  in  its  appearance  to  and  effects  on  human  beings  has  different 
significance for other beings.”
9 Sometimes (although less often) they also remind us that other 
beings too, may have their own phenomenology.
10 In other words they challenge what matters 
in terms of what appears (becomes manifest), what has (material) effects but also, and this is 
important, what could/should matter to (have significance for) humans in terms of our concerns 
(including our particular ethical and political concerns).  
Many  environmentalists  focus  on  the  implications  of  critiques  of  exemptionalism 
(including their ethical and political implications) using, for example, our expanding ecological 
knowledge concerning the knock-on, indirect, and systemic effects of species loss on human 
communities  to  urge  us  to  tread  lightly.  Such  critiques  may  also  recognise  that  the 
transformative roles other species can play in human values can provide a rationale for their 
conservation.  For  example,  Norton  argues  that  cultivating  interests  in,  and  concerns  for, 
preserving other species might induce less consumptive and materialistic values that will, in 
turn, help ensure humans do not drive themselves to extinction.
11 Since both those doing the 
ethical  valuing  and  those  ethically  valued  in  Norton’s  model  are  all  human  beings  such 
critiques  of  exemptionalism  clearly  still  accept  a  strong  form  of  exceptionalism  (which  we 
might also term an ecological humanism). 
More radical forms of ecology, environmental ethics, and environmental politics begin 
to  critique  human  exceptionalism  too.
  12 Usually  this  means  including  other  species  as 
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7 Environmental sociologists Catton and Dunlap first used the term (human) exemptionalist, referring to those social 
theories that paid little or no attention to ecology as exemplifying a Human Exemptionalist Paradigm (HEP). My 
use of the term exceptionalist here is intended to fit with my previous work emphasising an ecological (and not 
just a human) reading of Agamben’s work on the “state of exception.” W. R. Catton and R. E. Dunlap, 
“Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm,” The American Sociologist 13 (1978): 41-49; Giorgio Agamben, 
State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, 
Politics, and Saving the Natural World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011a). 
8 David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
9 Mick Smith, “Dis(appearance): Earth, Ethics and Apparently (In)significant Others,” Australian Humanities Review 
50 (2011b): 23-44. 
10 Although discourses of animal ethics often focus only on this aspect in terms of experiences of pain, arguments 
about animal consciousness, and so on. 
11 Brian Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety? (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
12 Norton’s argument assumes that we should preserve other species on the basis of their “positive” transformational 
value for humans. But why think that preserving other species always encourages positive transformational values Smith, Ecological Community / 25 
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members of an ethical (but usually not political) community that is, nonetheless, constituted 
only by human concerns (insofar as only the human species is deemed to have the potential to 
be ethical).
13 In other words, it is not just other human beings that matter ethically although 
what matters is still what matters ethically (in terms of appearance, effects, and significance) to 
humans. These ethical concerns can then, some argue, be translated into or represented within 
those already constituted political communities composed entirely of humans.
14  
Such approaches obviously retain aspects of exceptionalism, aspects that some might 
argue  are  inescapable  as  we  are,  after  all,  only  human(s).  The  fact  that  this  ecologically 
weakened  exceptionalism,  which  at  least  incorporates  a  genuine  environmental  ethics  (by 
which I mean regarding aspects of the environment, and not just members of our species, 
ethically) makes many environmentalists, including Norton, uncomfortable, surely reveals just 
how pervasive and powerful the ideology of exceptionalism is (at least in modern Western 
society). But critiques of exceptionalism might go further than awarding some other species 
honorary  membership  of  the  still  ethically  excepted  community  of  “that  which  matters  to 
humans.” Indeed perhaps they need to go much further if we are really going to take seriously 
the ideas that “what appears to human beings is not all that appears, that what affects human 
beings directly is not all that has effects, that what has significance for human beings has 
different significance” for others, and that other beings too may have their own phenomenal 
worlds. For this understanding of ecological community (the germ of which underlies even the 
least radical environmental critique of exemptionalism) explicitly emphasises that what matters 
in terms of the constitution of ecological community is always so much more than just what 
matters to humans.  
To reiterate and elaborate: Environmentalists, of whatever ilk, recognise the vital (living) 
importance  of  the  (more-than-just-human)  excess f o u n d  i n  e c o l o g i c a l  c o m m u n i t y .  T h e y  all 
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(what if the tiger from the sanctuary eats your aunt?) still less transforms our values in ways that provide an 
ecological argument for preserving those same species? There seems to be a circularity here, albeit it an 
environmentally virtuous one. If Norton’s point is that the considerations involved in preserving a particular 
species make us consider the bigger ecological picture (that is, make us more aware of the faults and human 
dangers of exemptionalism) then this may be the case, but that is not the same as providing an argument for 
preserving any particular species since, without an ecological ethics, these still have to be decided entirely in 
terms of their human benefits. There will, in any case, presumably be diminishing human returns in terms of the 
“ecological enlightenment” gained from every subsequent case concerning preservation, and especially for cases 
involving similar species (“I’ve heard this all before!”). Even if everyone finally accepted the critique of human 
exemptionalism (recognising that humans too can go extinct for ecological reasons) this will not necessarily 
encourage preservation of other species. As extinctions themselves show, nature is not actually a harmonious 
whole where everything is preserved so an anti-exemptionalism might also take the form of making it more 
socially acceptable to compete with other species more intensely for “limited resources” (“It’s us or them!”). 
Indeed this quasi-naturalistic view actually underlies the form of capitalism that currently produces the 
consumerist and materialist values Norton wants to transform. Surely it is these (selfish) values and this (capitalist 
and anthropocentric) system that need to be tackled head on and not least because of their driving other species to 
extinction. Finally, one might ask Norton what, on his anthropocentric criteria, would be wrong with deliberately 
making some prominent species extinct in a spectacular fashion if doing so would generate more debate about the 
ecological future of humanity than preserving them ever could? In other words, the critique of exemptionalism is 
not enough, we need a critique of exceptionalism too; we need an ecological ethics and politics. 
13 Such approaches can, of course, also include ethical concerns about non-living entities like rock formations, 
canyons, and so on. Many such concerns are place-focused.   
14 See, for example, Robin Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2004). 26 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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have some such understanding of ecology in common but many (like Norton) only recognise 
this shared understanding’s importance to the survival (and quality of life) of those constituting 
an excepted human ethical and political community.
15 Here, the community that matters, as a 
community, is a community limited to one species served by all others that matter to it only 
insofar as they remain useful in one way or another. But this ecological humanism seems to 
run counter to any emphasis placed on the constitutive diversity and generative excess that, in 
every sense me n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  c o mp o s e s  a n  e c o l o g i c a l  c o mmu n i t y  as a n  e c o l o g i c a l  ( i n t e r-
specific) community. An ethics that considers only what affects one’s own species is one that 
has taken little note of the actual ways in which ecological communities are co-constituted. 
Indeed,  what  we  are  presented  with  here  is  actually  a  rather  unethical  denial o f  b e i n g  i n  
community with others—the imposition of a limit on ethics—a sovereign decision to make an 
ethical exception of the whole of non-human nature.
16  
Those environmentalists who do recognise the ethical importance of other species, who 
are ethically concerned about the impending extinction of even apparently useless, dangerous, 
or insignificant beings
17 are, at least, more consistent than these environmental exceptionalists 
who simultaneously employ, and yet find themselves in (ethical) denial of, the implications of 
being in an ecological community. Once we accept there are (more than just human) ethical 
implications  of  being  in  ecological  community  with  others,  once  we  are  exposed  to  such 
concerns,  this  opens  further  ways  to  weaken  exceptionalism,  ways  that  also  have  political 
implications.  One  way  (and  there  are  many  others)  of  weakening  exceptionalism  is  by 
recognising  that  it  is  not  only  humans,  and  apparently  not  all  humans,  that  have  ethical 
sensibilities. If ethics is also a mode in which communities can be created and constituted, a 
sensibility that allows things to appear in an other-directed loving gaze, to affect events, hearts, 
and minds, to open new fields of significance, to “colour” the phenomenal world, then this is 
not a mode that is in any sense co-extensive with the human species.
18  
A more radical ecology, then, means reconsidering the very sense of community (and 
“sense  of  the  world”)  in  such  a  way  that  the  senselessness  of  extinctions  is  rendered  in 
ecological and ethical and political terms that are no longer beholden to either the exemption 
of the human (from ecology) or the exception of the ecological (from ethical and political 
community). Such considerations might be described as ecologically posthumanist,
 19 not in the 
sense of envisaging what might happen to the world after humans too become extinct (as they 
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15 Norton rejects the idea that non-human species might have value to other non-human species because he thinks 
“value transformations only take place in consciousness” (Why Preserve Natural Variety? 13) and presumably he 
assumes that consciousness is something only humans have. I see no good reason for thinking either of these 
positions are even remotely likely, or for that matter, for thinking the only values that matter to members of all 
other species must be “transformational” values. 
16 We can say this is a decision because there is nothing about ethics as such, as a caring sensibility, which means 
that it has to be limited to concerns for other humans. See Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty for an extended 
discussion of this point and a critique of the idea of ecological sovereignty.  
17 For examples see Deborah Bird Rose and Thom van Dooren, eds., “Unloved Others: Death and the Disregarded 
in the time of Extinctions,” special issue of Australian Humanities Review 50 (2011). 
18 Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009). 
19 Although not posthumanism, in the sense of a single unified over-arching theoretical and/or ideological 
perspective to rival and replace humanism. Smith, Ecological Community / 27 
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most certainly will one day) but of elucidating certain worldly possibilities that emerge from 
critiques of human exemptionalism and exceptionalism together. 
 
A Posthumanist Excursus 
Why might ecological understandings begin to move us towards post-humanist perspectives? 
Once it might have seemed easy to gloss extinctions as the natural outcome of the “struggle for 
existence” and ecology as “the [natural] science of the struggle for existence.”
20 Ecology, so 
understood would have no role “meddling” in human ethics and politics.
21 But things are not 
so simple. Such descriptions hide more than they reveal. What is it that is “natural” about 
extinctions  induced  by  contemporary  human  activities?  Indeed  is  anything  “natural” 
anymore?
22 In what sense is there a “struggle for existence”; a struggle between who, what, 
when, how? Is existence naturally just that, a constant struggle without respite? Is this struggle 
really all that ecology is about? Can struggle and extinction be reconciled with a notion of 
ecological community? Are ecological communities not just a matter for (natural) “science”? 
What about ethical and political aspects of struggle and/or community? These are complicated 
questions and also questions that are deliberately complicated by a posthumanist notion of 
“ecological community.”  
A  posthumanist  notion  of  ecological  community  emphasises  the  myriad  ways  that 
beings of all kinds, including human individuals and collectives, interact to create, sustain, 
and/or dissolve communities.
23 The posthumanist inclusion of human activities with/in ecology 
is not an attempt to naturalise them, reducing them to just a matter of biology, but nor does it 
seek to separate certain (social and cultural) fields of human action as being entirely set apart 
from,  or  superior  to,  those  characterising  all  other  species  (that  is,  it  seeks  to  weaken 
exceptionalism). A post-humanist perspective takes seriously the need to stop what Agamben 
refers to as the “anthropological machine”, the constant “production” of absolute dividing lines 
between humans and the rest of the natural world.
24 It recognises “the fragility and porosity of 
the limit between nature and culture” not so as to collapse these categories into each other (as, 
for example, sociobiology does) but to “multiply attention to differences” at all levels.
 25 
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20  Gregory J. Cooper, The Science of the Struggle for Existence: On the Foundations of Ecology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). Ecologist David Raup suggests that 99.9% of all species that have ever existed 
have become extinct. Markku Oksanen, “Biodiversity considered philosophically,” in Philosophy and Biodiversity, 
ed. Markku Oksanen and Juhani Pietarinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-23 (9). Steven M. 
Stanley’s authoritative Extinction posits climate change as the natural cause of past mass extinctions but makes no 
comments on current extinction rates and no reference to the possibility of human induced climate change. Steven 
M. Stanley, Extinction (New York: Scientific American Library, 1987). 
21 Although, of course, capitalism’s ideologues often try to naturalise their economics, their politics, and their lack of 
ethics through reference to such an underlying struggle of each against all. 
22 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1990). 
23 Smith, “Dis(appearance).” 
24 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); 
Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty. 
25 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 16, 17. 
The term posthuman clearly has multiple meanings, but rather than associating it directly with the “transhumanist” 
focus on the technological erosion of universal definitions of humanity, with the specifics of Haraway’s “cyborg 
manifesto”, and still less with programs promoting the engineered enhancement of human biological capacities 
(which as Wolfe (Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xv) 
points out is really an “intensification of humanism”, that is of what I term exemptionalism) I want to emphasise 28 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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One aspect of this, which links directly to questions about ecology’s status and remit, is 
the posthumanist challenge to what Latour refers to as modernity’s “constitution”, that is, “the 
separation  between  the  scientific  power  charged  with  representing  things  [nature]  and  the 
political  power  charged  with  representing  [human]  subjects.”
26 This  challenge  differs  from 
simply  arguing  that  human  political  communities  are  ultimately  dependent  upon  nature 
(ecology), for, as argued above, this anti-exemptionalism can still suggest a base/superstructure 
model where nature is the resource utilised and operated upon by human communities that 
retain a clearly circumscribed ethical and political sphere. Here, in this exceptionalist model, 
ecology and community are still held apart as separate although inter-connected wholes. The 
posthumanist approach, by contrast, suggests that a) ethical and political community no longer 
be envisioned as something limited to humans qua their being human; that any community 
will  include  all  manner  of  different  things  and  beings  (denizens
27)  that  are  also  active  in 
constituting that community; and b) that ecology is never just a scientific description of the 
world but ineradicably a matter of ethics and politics too.  
Posthumanist  ecological  communities  connect  across  nature a n d  culture,  (scientific) 
“facts”  and  (ethical  and  political)  values,  human  beings a n d  other  beings,  eroding  and 
complicating these very categories. Such connections are not to be thought of like bridges 
connecting separate, well defined regions, but more like the connections with/in the human 
body itself, between its “own” cells and the trillions of micro-organisms of more than 1000 
different species, parasitic, commensal, and symbiotic, that inhabit and compose it.
28  For a 
human being is itself, already an ecological community, an admixture of different species, 
things, thoughts, meanings, values. Emphasising such connections begins to deconstruct the 
ontological certainties and absolute distinctions that have supported various forms of human 
exemptionalism  and  exceptionalism.  We  are  ineradicably  hybrid  beings  inhabiting  hybrid 
geographies.
29 
Clearly  then,  unpacking  the  ways  in  which  posthumanist  communities  may  be 
constituted,  recognised,  sustained  or  altered  is  never  going  to  be  simply  a  matter  of 
“community ecology” in the narrow scientific sense.
30 It also relates to the meanings and values 
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the multiple social and biological ways in which the universalist anthropological dogmas of ethical and political 
humanism are challenged through recognising various forms of cross-species ecological community. 
26 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 29. 
27 This term “denizens” is meant to disturb and critique (not just expand) forms of politics modelled on communities 
based on notions of human citizenship. Mick Smith, “Citizens, Denizens and the Res Publica: Environmental 
Ethics, Structures of Feeling and Political Expression,” Environmental Values 14 (2005): 145-162. 
28 Jennifer Ackerman, “The Ultimate Social Network. Friendly Bacteria that Live in our Bodies and on our Skin 
Profoundly Affect our Health,” New Scientist 306, no. 6 (2012): 36-43. 
29 Arturo Escobar, “After Nature: Steps to an Antiessentialist Political Ecology,” Current Anthropology 40, no. 1 
(1999): 1-30; Sarah Whatmore, Hybrid Geographies. Nature, Cultures, Spaces (London: SAGE, 2002). Which is 
not to say that I wholeheartedly endorse Escobar’s particular version of “political ecology” or Latour’s actor 
network theory (ANT) which informs Whatmore’s arguments about hybridity.  
30 The notion of “community ecology” is itself a locus of intense scientific debate where “community” is understood, 
at one extreme, in terms of simple geographically located assemblages of different beings, populations, and 
species or, at the other extreme, in terms of highly integrated, interdependent, and cohesive superorganisms (e.g. 
Clements, see Peter Marshall, Nature’s Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (London: Simon Schuster, 
1992), 337). Smith, Ecological Community / 29 
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created,  expressed,  and  suppressed  within  and  by  such  communities.  Contra  humanistic 
approaches, these meanings and values may include, but are not limited to, those associated 
with  humans.  Just  what  this  entails  remains  to  be  exposed  but  a  posthuman  notion  of 
ecological  community  complicates  matters  for  hermeneutic  and v a l u a t i o n a l   and e c o l o g i c a l  
reasons. Moreover, the meanings and values created within and by such communities evolve; 
they are constantly re-interpreted, re-evaluated, re-formulated, re-produced, and re-enacted. 
And while such meanings and values are certainly contested in all manner of ways, here, as 
with the evolving relations between different beings, populations, and species (and with/in the 
human body itself) this “contest” is rarely if ever simply a matter of a “struggle for existence.” 
There  are,  for  example,  all  manner  of  forms  of  symbiosis,  symbiogenesis,  commensalism, 
mutualism,  enculturalisation,  association,  learning  from/with  others,  sympathy,  and  so  on 
varying from the most intimate to the most casual.
31 Indeed, this is partly why it might be 
appropriate  to c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  c o m p l e x  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  r u b r i c  o f  e c o l o g y  a n d  o f  
community at all rather than just some generalised notion of “competition.” This is also why, 
under  certain  circumstances,  those  concerned  might  sense  the  loss  of  those  who  cease  to 
constitute  ecological  community  with  them  as  something  other  than  just  the  welcome 
eradication of a competitor. 
 
Senses of Community, Sense of Loss 
Environmental critiques of exemptionalism suggest that human beings are in community with 
other  species  whether  or  not  they  actually  recognise  this,  whether  or  not  they  deny  these 
ecological  realities.  The  critique  of  exceptionalism  (and  Latour’s  critique  of  the  modern 
constitution) suggests that this community is ethically, politically and ecologically complicated. 
The ecological posthumanist suggests that we need to cease being in denial of these ethical 
and political complications. Understanding what this might mean obviously requires saying 
more about sense(s) of community and senses(s) of being lost to community through extinction. 
How might all the senses already iterated—the sense of (dis)appearances, the sense of effects, 
the sense of semiosis, the sense of phenomenology and also the complications introduced by 
ethical sensibilities and political sensitivities—be gathered together? How can one even begin 
to delimit what might, again alluding to Nancy, be termed, the “sense of the world”?  
Perhaps, one might even say, the realisation of ecological community only begins to 
make sense through the senseless event of extinction. This pointless and irredeemable loss 
touches some of us in ways that reveal the infinite complications in trying to specify what is left 
in the wake of the death (finitude) of an entire mode of being(s). The ecologist (in a more than 
scientific sense) is someone who is touched by this loss in such a way as to mourn the toll of 
extinction instituted by human exemptionalism and exceptionalism. She is bereft and yet also 
understands that this feeling, her being touched by irrevocable loss, is itself a matter of realising 
the  existence  of  a  sense  of  an  ecological  and e t h i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o m m u n i t y  w i t h  o t h e r  
species. The species lost is not just a potential resource of which humans are deprived, but an 
example  of  exceptional  ethical  irresponsibility,  one  which  can  also  incite  (ethical) 
responsibilities and (political) resistance. (Historically, we might go so far as to say that the 
sense of ecological community could only arise after the recognition that species could indeed 
go extinct, and that human beings could be responsible for such extinctions, both things that 
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31 Jan Sapp, Evolution by Association: A History of Symbiosis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 30 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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many of those with pre-evolutionary interests in fossils, like Thomas Jefferson, were concerned 
to  deny  since  it  undermined  the  notion  of  a  perfectly  pre-formed  and  unalterable  natural 
economy.
32)  
Does this de-finition (this posthuman opening out) of ecological community differ from 
how ecology is understood scientifically? Yes and no. It certainly differs insofar as it explicitly 
recognises the ethical and political complications that those scientists who accept modernism’s 
constitution struggle (usually unsuccessfully) to keep separate from their professional ecological 
activities. It suggests that these complications are irresolvable aspects of being in ecological 
community. But then this difference is, in actuality, only a matter of recognising and unfolding 
the  wider  implications o f  e c o l o g y  a s  t h e  “ s e n s e  o f  t h e  w o r l d . ”  T h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  t o  t h i n k  
ecologically is already, in a sense, to think in terms of community, of the ineradicability of 
“being-with” others, of a co-existence that, while it differs for each singular being and each 
species is, nonetheless, always a world from which we are never exempted so long as we exist 
and from which we can only except ourselves artificially (through the ruse of human(ism’s) 
sovereignty
33) and with dreadful ecological, ethical, and political consequences.  
To speak of ecological community is to recognise that we are, ineradicably, “we” in 
something like Nancy’s sense of an Inoperative Community and Being Singular Plural.
34 For 
Nancy we are always already “beings in common.” Here, the singular aspect in “being singular 
plural” does not signify an originally pre-communal individual that subsequently goes on to 
construct community with others (as, for example, in social contract theory) —especially not 
with others just like herself, that is, with some essential thing in common, for example, their 
“human  nature”,  consciousness,  and  so  on.  Similarly  the  plural  aspect  of  “being  singular 
plural” does not signify the ontological priority of something called community over singular 
beings, or refer to any communal essence which unites all its members. Rather the composite 
term is intended to bring to mind the irreducible condition of worldly existence, of a “being 
singular with plural others.” Ecology is a reminder of a multi-species and multi-existent “we” 
that modern humanism chose to forget, or rather struggled to exempt and/or except the human 
species from. There is no way to be exempt from this community of different beings each 
exposed to each other in myriad different ways. Indeed the in-common of being-in-common is 
this exposure of each to each other and this being touched by each other.  
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32 Jefferson, who collected fossils and even had an extinct giant sloth named after him (Megalonx jeffersoni), later 
admitted, at least in private, that extinctions could occur. Mark V. Barrow, Nature’s Ghosts: Confronting Extinction 
from the Age of Jefferson to the Age of Ecology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 19. 
33 Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty. 
34 Nancy, Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). I say 
“something like” Nancy’s understanding because rather than simply adopt Nancy’s terms of art which are largely 
developed within the context of providing an understanding and ontology of human community (of Mitdasein) I 
obviously want to adapt them ecologically (see Smith, “Epharmosis”). This is not fanciful because Nancy provides 
something like an ecological interpretation in The Sense of the World. He also remarks, for example, in Being 
Singular Plural, that his “thinking is in no way anthropocentric; it does not put humanity at the centre of  ‘creation’; 
on the contrary, it transgresses [traverse] humanity in the excess of the appearing that appears on the scale of the 
totality of being, but which also appears as that excess [demesure] which is impossible to totalize.” (Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 17). While I think his work is actually 
anthropocentric in several ways, and even retains a degree of residual human exceptionalism, it has the potential 
to be developed in a much more ecological way. Smith, Ecological Community / 31 
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Being in common means that singular beings are, present themselves, and appear only to 
the extent that they compear (comparaissent), to the extent that they are exposed, presented, 
or offered to one another. This compearance (comparution) is not something added to their 
being; rather, their being comes into being in it.
35 
 
The “sense of the world” that Nancy intends is not then a conceptual grasp of an entirety (in 
the way that Heidegger uses an ability to grasp the world as world as yet another means to 
demarcate  and  except  the  human  (in  the  form  of  Dasein)  from  the  rest  of  the  world’s 
inhabitants who are, Heidegger says, world-poor (in the case of animals) or worldless (in the 
case of non-living matter)).
36 Rather, the sense of the world is the touching of bodies each 
against  the  other,  a  touching  sensed  ecologically  in  different  ways  by  different  beings  and 
different species of beings. So, as Derrida argues there is a sense in which  
 
touching is not a sense, at least not one sense amongst others. A finite living being can live 
and survive without any other sense; and this occurs with a host of animals that have no 
vision (it is possible to be sensitive to light without “seeing”), no hearing (it is possible to be 
sensitive to sound waves without “hearing”), no taste or sense of smell … But no living 
being in the world can survive for an instant without touching, which is to say without 
being  touched  …  for  a  finite  being,  before  and  beyond  any  concept  of  “sensibility,” 
touching means “being in the world.” There is no world without touching …
37 
 
Here, we might say, what matters in terms of the sense of the world is what touches each being 
in terms of the species of possibilities open to it, in terms of what appears, what affects, what 
has meaning, what is experienced, what ethical sensibilities that being may (or may not) have, 
and even what political sense our being in ecological community may (or may not) have. 
Scientific ecology offers us an important glimpse of ecological community, but often 
through an objectifying lens that diminishes the observer’s actual placement and involvement 
in  that  community  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  accepting  a  constitution  which  excepts  it  from 
making such evaluations. Ecosystems are mapped and energy flows measured, species at risk 
of extinction are enumerated. Connections are elaborated in terms of what appears to science 
(through  repeatable  experimental  protocols),  what  effects  can  be  measured  by  scientific 
instruments,  what  has  meaning  within  scientific  theories,  what  can  be  observed  with  eyes 
(cons)trained to only see “objects.”
38 Ethics and politics have no official place here at all.  
This might suggest that scientific ecology can have nothing ethical or political to say 
about extinction or ecological community. Perhaps, though, conservation biology might be 
thought  of  as  the  ethical  and  political  wing  of  scientific  ecology.  Interestingly,  in  his 
introductory explanation of conservation biology Michael E. Soulé, a key figure in the area, 
places himself ethico/politically within a narrative that explicitly seeks to resist human induced 
extinctions:  
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35 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 58. 
36 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
37 Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 140. 
38 Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien: Humankind and the Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 32 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  
Conservation biology, a new stage in the application of science to conservation problems, 
addresses the biology of species, communities, and ecosystems that are perturbed, either 
directly or indirectly, by human activities or other agents. Its goal is to provide principles 
and tools for preserving biological diversity … I also point out that ethical norms are a 
genuine  part  of  conservation  biology,  as  they  are  in  all  mission- o r  c r i s i s -oriented 
disciplines.
39 
 
But, of course, conservation biology too has to present itself as thoroughly scientific for its 
ethical  (and  more  covertly,  its  political)  messages  to  be  credible  within  the  parameters  of 
modernity’s  constitution.  This  creates  obvious  (but  from  a  posthumanist  perspective, 
unavoidable) tensions in its practices and pronouncements.  
The  version  of  ecological  community  proposed  by  many  conservation  biologists, 
including Soulé, is also one that, partly because of its scientistic understanding, has tended to 
emphasise the value of species and ecosystems as something separable from a sense of being 
in community with each singular being. That is, it emphasises plurality (and only in the limited 
form of a scientific understanding of biodiversity) at the expense of singularity.  
 
It may seem logical to extend the aversion of anthropogenic extinction of populations to 
the  suffering  and  untimely  deaths  of  individuals  because  populations  are  composed  of 
individuals. I do not believe this step is necessary or desirable for conservation biology. 
Although  disease  and  suffering  in  animals  are  unpleasant  and,  perhaps,  regrettable, 
biologists  recognize  that  conservation  is  engaged  in  the  protection  of  the  integrity  and 
continuity of natural processes, not the welfare of individuals … biologists often overcome 
their emotional identification with individual victims.
40 
 
The singular being, regarded in its singularity (including, as Soulé’s words suggest, its own 
unique phenomenology of suffering) is perhaps, more difficult to objectify.
41 (Although, as so 
many animal experiments prove, such objectification is by no means impossible.) Any concern 
shown for “individuals” as subjects or quasi-subjects threatens to compromise the scientific 
objectivity (and hence for Soulé ultimately the potential political efficacy) of those arguing for 
conserving the more abstract and easily objectifiable notion of a species. “Conservation and 
animal  welfare  …  are”,  Soulé  remarks,  “conceptually  distinct,  and  they  should  remain 
politically separate.”
42  
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39 Michael E. Soulé, “What is Conservation Biology?” BioScience 35, no. 11 (1985): 727-734 (727). 
40 Ibid., 731. 
41 Evernden, The Natural Alien. 
42 Soulé, “What is Conservation Biology?” 731. My emphasis. There are certainly very important conceptual and 
political differences between most mainstream animal ethics and (posthumanist) environmental ethics. Although 
these are beyond the scope of this paper one might briefly say that, where Soulé recognises only a limited 
(objectivised) plurality stripped of any ethical sensibilities concerning the phenomenological experiences of non-
humans, mainstream animal ethicists recognise only extremely limited (subjectivised) forms of singularity as 
ethically relevant based almost entirely on speculative phenomenologies i.e. what feelings a specific kind of 
animal might have. This, in turn, almost invariably means that ethical concerns are limited to a select number of Smith, Ecological Community / 33 
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In  any  case,  it  is  clearly  the  extension o f  ethical c o n c e r n s  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  i t s  
association  with  (irrational  and  therefore  unscientific)  emotionality  that  worries  Soulé  here 
even though, somewhat incongruously, he does recognise that ethical concerns for populations 
and species are valid. Here he tries to downplay any emotionality (and any threat to objectivity) 
by  providing  “purely”  scientific  reasons  for  holding  specific  ethical  values  concerning 
biodiversity:
43 “Species have value in themselves, a value neither conferred nor revocable, but 
springing from a species’ long evolutionary heritage and potential or even from the mere fact of 
its  existence.”
44 Even  if  we  ignore  the  numerous  philosophical  questions  raised  by  this 
understanding  of  species’  “intrinsic”  value  it  is  clear  that  Soulé  awards  the  “integrity  and 
continuity  of  natural  processes”  a  “higher”  over-arching  value  which  actually  requires 
biologists to actively work to overcome any ethical/emotional concerns for singular beings. 
This position seems to unnecessarily universalise a distinction (and to install a form of ethical 
exception) that is ethically dubious in several respects. It is obviously only tenable to the extent 
that one can make processes qua processes, or diversity qua diversity, the “object” of ethical 
concern, or of a “higher” concern that trumps all other (non-human) ethics. Leaving aside 
questions  about  the  reification  of  processes,  few  of  us  can,  I  suspect,  actually  concern 
ourselves ethically with a process, say photosynthesis, vital as it is, without considering its 
actual and singular instantiations. We come to the sense of ethical community through our 
involvements with beings that are inherently singular and plural even if we understand that 
singularity and plurality as emerging through ecological (and ethical and political) “processes.” 
What we concern ourselves with is, for example, the oak tree (which is actually inseparable 
from its ecological relations) and if we seek to save trees like the Hinton’s oak tree (Quercus 
hintonii) from extinction then our concern does not cease when their leaves fall in winter and 
photosynthesis ceases. 
Similarly biodiversity is not something that many could relate to ethically as a “process”, 
although  Norton  (following  Wood
45)  makes  an  interesting  suggestion  along  these  lines. 
Biodiversity,  he  says,  should  not  be  thought  of  as  “a  resource  among  others,  but  as  a 
generator—a source—of biological resources”, that is, as “a generative process”, much, he 
claims, as neoliberals value free markets as generators of value.
46 “Just as economists would 
find it odd to be asked, “What is the market value of a free market?” Ecologists may find it odd 
to think of biodiversity as a commodity.”
47 Now Norton’s point here is clearly to suggest that 
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species that are sufficiently like “us” (phenomenologically) to warrant inclusion in already existing liberal 
individualist models of human ethics.  
43 If it’s the process that matters why, we might ask, should we even concern ourselves with individual species going 
extinct so long as these are not keystone species?  
44 Soulé, “What is Conservation Biology?” 731. If the “mere fact of existence” was enough to make something of 
ethical concern then it is not clear why this would not apply to individuals too, or indeed to every human artifice. 
And, of course, every singular being is also the result of a long evolutionary process and singular beings are 
entirely necessary for the “process” of evolution to “work” at all. 
45  Paul M. Wood, “Biodiversity as the Source of Biological Resources: A New Look at Biodiversity Values,” 
Environmental Values 6, no. 3 (1997): 251-268. 
46 Bryan Norton “What Do We Owe the Future? How Should We Decide?” 221. Similarly Soulé argues that 
“Evolution is the machine, and life is its product. One possible corollary of this axiom is an ethical imperative to 
provide for the continuation of evolutionary processes …” (Soulé, “What is Conservation Biology?” 731), but 
actually, neither evolution nor life per se are endangered, only their current instantiations. 
47 Bryan Norton “What Do We Owe the Future? How Should We Decide?” 221. 34 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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biodiversity per se is not something one should translate into the commodity form, and many 
environmentalists would certainly agree with this. But this analogy actually raises a further 
question,  namely  what  happens  if  and  when  an  abstract  understanding  of  the  system  in 
question is valued on a “higher logical plane”
48 than the actual outcomes it generates? What 
happens  when,  in  Soulé’s  terms,  we  have  succeeded  in  overcoming  any  emotional 
identification with the system’s victims? The misery caused to communities and to individuals 
world-wide by the heartless application of free-market capitalism might thereby be taken as an 
excellent reason for not regarding these processes as something of higher value that can be 
separated out from concerns for the singular. Indeed this is precisely why Nancy contrasts “the 
sense of the world” as creation with that generated by contemporary forms of “globalization.”
49   
Nancy’s ontology suggests that there are other ways of thinking about these issues, not 
in terms of process and system but in terms of (ecological) community. We are touched by 
each other in myriad ways. Beings appear to us, but they never just appear and they never 
appear just to us humans. Beings have (sensed and un-sensed) effects on us, but they never just 
have  effects  on  us.  Similarly,  the  meanings  things  have  for  one  species  may  be  radically 
different for others, the phenomenology of their sensing the world is unimaginably varied. This 
biodiversity  matters  in  all  manner  of  ways  to  all  manner  of  creatures.  The  ecological 
posthumanist recognises that these diverse matters can also matter ethically and politically, but 
she is not the only one to whom they matter ethically and politically; she just has a specific 
understanding which might be elucidated through the concept of “being singular plural.”  
As I have argued elsewhere
50 one way of beginning to envisage such a posthumanist 
ecological community might be through Jacob von Uexküll’s “A Stroll through the Worlds of 
Animals and Men” (subtitled in its original translation into English “A Picture Book of Invisible 
Worlds”).
51 Indeed,  the  fact  that  this  work  has  recently  been  re-translated
52 attests  to  its 
growing appeal to many interested in posthumanist perspectives. His phenomenological re-
description of a walk through a familiar meadow opens new, and very unfamiliar, vistas that 
are hardly ever considered by scientific objectivism and philosophical humanism. They express, 
says  Agamben,  “the  unreserved  abandonment  of  every  anthropocentric  perspective  in  the 
human sciences and the radical dehumanization of the image of nature.”
53 
Uexküll famously asks us to imagine the diverse perceptual worlds (Umwelten) of the 
inhabitants of the meadow such as the field-mouse, earthworm, butterfly or, most notoriously, 
the tick, “worlds strange to us but known to other creatures, manifold and varied as the animals 
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48 Ibid., 221. 
49 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007). 
50 Smith, “Dis(appearance)”. 
51 Jacob von Uexküll, “A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds,” in 
Instinctive Behaviour: The Development of a Modern Concept, ed. Claire H. Schiller & Karl S. Lashley (London: 
Methuen & Co, 1957).  
52 The new translation includes an insightful afterword by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young on the reception of Uexküll’s 
work. See also Buchanan’s thorough and thoughtful elucidation of Uexküll’s ideas and influence. Jacob von 
Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); 
Brett Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze 
(Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2008). 
53 Agamben, The Open, 39. Smith, Ecological Community / 35 
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themselves.”
54 We are asked to think of these worlds as soap bubbles we might step into. As 
we slip out of our own perceptual world and enter another world “the familiar meadow is 
transformed. Many of its colourful features disappear, others no longer belong together but 
appear in new relationships with different meanings. A new world comes into being […] the 
world as it appears to the animals themselves, not as it appears to us.”
55 
The  phenomenal  world  of  the  tick,  for  instance,  would  seem  entirely  alien  to  us. 
Everything we see and hear would disappear, the trees, flowers, birdsong, the rustling wind, 
butterflies. So far as the tick is concerned the meadow we walk through hardly exists, her 
relation to it goes little further than climbing an available grass stem to drop on any prey that 
passes below. Her senses are limited to a vague photosensitivity (a sensitivity without seeing—
since she has no eyes), an ability to “smell” butyric acid, (the sweat of her mammalian prey) 
and a sensitivity to temperature that will instigate her to drink her prey’s blood after biting (or 
indeed any other fluid presented to her at around 37°C, since she has no sense of taste). What 
appears to the tick is not, then, what appears to other species, to field mice,  earthworms, 
humans, or butterflies. How and whether the tick appears to others depends on their specific 
senses. I might see her only after she becomes engorged on my blood; I did not feel her bite. 
What affects the tick and what effects she has on others (for instance, the diseases she might 
carry) may or may not be sensed in various ways by various other species. My not sensing her 
bite might be fatal, the earthworm not sensing her is almost immaterial. What has meaning for 
the tick, what Uexküll refers to as “marks of significance,” is not what has meaning for other 
disparate species, or at least not the same meaning, or not in the same way.
56 Yet the tick is 
constitutive of the meadow’s ecological community, she is a denizen of a world that does not 
exist only on one plane but is materially patterned in all these senses—apparently, effectively, 
meaningfully, phenomenally—gathered together, inextricably singular and plural. 
Evolution then, from this perspective, is not so much a “process” as just the way that 
this patterning, the mutual exposures of each of these myriad beings, plays out through time 
and across generations and this is never simply the playing out of a struggle between pre-
existing isolated and selfish individuals. It is very much more complicated than that. And when 
we begin to recognise that humans are not exempt from these relations and that ethics and 
politics too are modes of patterning involved in ecological appearances, with ecological effects 
and meanings, and which infuse phenomenal experiences in ways that are much too readily 
accepted  as  anthropologically  exceptional,  then  we  begin  to  approach  an  ecologically 
posthumanist understanding of community.   
Does  such  an  understanding  entail  that  we  must  rush  out  and  save  ticks  from 
extinction?
57 Well,  first  we  had  better  recognise  that  there  are  many  different  tick  species, 
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54 Uexküll, “A Stroll,” 5. 
55 Ibid. 
56 It is no accident that Uexküll’s work has been, along with Peircian semiotics, the major influence on the recent 
flowering of biosemiotics. Barbieri, ed., Introduction to Biosemiotics. 
57 Hatley’s fascinating discussion of our relation to ticks and their extinction notes that, despite these recorded 
threats, no ticks were listed on the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List as of 2009. This 
omission can only be explained, he suggests, as a form of “zoomorphic bigotry.” (James Hatley, “Blood Intimacies 
and Biodicy: Keeping Faith with Ticks,” Australian Humanities Review 50 (2011): 63-75 (65)). Hatley’s paper 
develops an innovative argument regarding those ticks that parasitise humans. Despite their obviously detrimental 
effects on their human hosts he suggests that their hunger for our blood can serve to remind us of our biological 36 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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perhaps 900 world-wide, maybe many more, some 48 of which, science tells us, are regarded 
as  being  under  threat  of  extinction  due  to  geographically  restricted  ranges a n d / o r  t h e  
endangerment of their specific host species.
58 In other words, the tick’s endangerment comes 
about precisely because of the very specificity and irreplaceability of their modes of touching 
and being touched by the particular other species on which their lives have evolutionarily 
come to depend, host species that are themselves in danger for reasons having little or nothing 
to  do  with  their  parasitic  “guests”  but  result  from  other,  human  induced,  fractures  in  their 
communities. 
We might note that Uexküll himself was not specific about which kind of tick he was 
referring  to  and  that  the  most  endangered  species  may  actually  be  one  (Amblyomma 
sphenodonti) with a rather different Umwelt to that he describes, since it parasitises only the 
endangered tuatara, the last extant member of the entire order Rhynchocephalia.
59 The cold-
blooded tuatara is not a lizard, although it resembles one to the untrained human eye. It is now 
found only on certain islands off the New Zealand coast that have remained free of the, human 
introduced,  Polynesian  rat,  (Rattus  exulans)  responsible  for  the  demise  of  all  mainland 
populations.  The  tuatara  (but  not  its  tick!)  is  the  subject  of  intense  conservation  efforts, 
including several captive breeding programs and an attempt to reintroduce it to the mainland 
in a heavily fenced area.
60 The range of the tick, however, is even more restricted than its 
“host” as it is found on only eight of the 28 islands with tuatara populations.
61 These radically 
different species have a co-evolutionary relation that goes back at least to the Pleistocene era 
which perhaps explains why the ticks seem to do little harm to the tuatara.
62 Should the tuatara 
go extinct, the tick will surely follow. But the loss of the tick would probably not affect the 
tuatara’s chance of survival, whether individually or as a species. Does this make the loss of 
the tick inconsequential, or even an unexpected bonus for the tuatara who may have been 
trying to rid themselves of this “guest” for millions of years?
63 
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embodiment and our ecological and evolutionary emplacement in the world. Insofar as we might “affirm” their 
existence, and may even come to love those who make us suffer, we might develop a kind of biodicy rather than a 
theodicy. This, perhaps, has similarities to Norton’s argument regarding transformational values (see footnote 12 
above). 
58 L.A. Durden and J. E. Keirans, “Host-parasite coextinction and the plight of tick conservation,” American 
Entomologist 42 (1996): 87-91. 
59 All three life stages of the tick apparently feed only on the tuatara. Hilary Miller, Ailis M. Conrad, Stephen C. 
Barker, and Charles H. Daugherty, “Distribution and phylogenetic analyses of an endangered tick, Amblyomma 
sphenodonti,” New Zealand Journal of Zoology 34, no. 2 (2007): 97-105 (103). 
60 Some tuatara populations at risk were also temporarily removed from islands with rat populations while the rats 
were “eradicated.” They were then returned. 
61 Miller et al., “Distribution.” 
62 Miller et al., remark that “studies have shown no evidence of a negative effect of tickload on body condition of 
tuatara … suggesting that removal of ticks during tuatara translocations may not be necessary. However, it should 
be noted that the effect of ticks on disease transmission and tuatara fitness has not specifically been investigated.” 
(“Distribution,” 103). 
63 The singular tick, lacking the requisite level of phenomenal experience would presumably matter little to most of 
those concerned with individualistic forms of animal ethics (see footnote 57) especially when its survival conflicts 
with the individual lives of even the commonest (but obviously much more “intelligent” and human-like) rats. Of Smith, Ecological Community / 37 
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To save the tuatara from extinction we are forced to think ecologically. That is, we have 
to consider and attend to the different ways the tuatara’s existence touches, and is touched by, 
others. When we attend to these ecological relations we find a species of tick that actually 
punctures the tuatara’s skin to feed on its blood, and only on its blood. What more intimate 
form of touch could there be? And yet, that tick inhabits a radically different phenomenal 
world to the tuatara and the effects of these species on each other are also radically different. 
The tuatara provides the tick with its “lifeblood”, while to the tuatara the ticks may just be a 
mild irritation if they even notice them at all. (Is this the only meaning ticks have for the 
tuatara?)  These  ecological  relations  are  complex  and  in  no  sense  equal  or  reciprocal  or 
reducible to a simple metric. One species unwittingly gives, the other unwittingly takes, but the 
species that takes is actually the more dependent, the most at risk of extinction. Ecological 
communities are not really very much like exceptionalist views of human communities, they 
are far more complicated and so, when present, are their ethical and political dimensions. 
Who, but an ecologist, would even suspect such relations? Thanks to this ecological 
attention, this resistance to extinction, we also discovered, although only in 1989, that there 
are  actually  two  species  of  tuatara  and  not  one:  two  species  whose  appearances  are, 
presumably, indistinguishable, and a matter of little consequence for most other constituents of 
that ecological community.
64 The ecological concern for the tuatara’s singularity, its being an 
only survivor, its unusual physiognomy with a light sensitive “third eye” on the top of its head 
(what  differences  might  this  make  phenomenologically?),  its  troubled  history  with  human 
cultures, its precarious island existence, and so on, all elicit a concern that is certainly a matter 
of ethics and not just mere scientific curiosity.
65 The attempt to save the tuatara is one place 
where  the  recognition  of  ecological  community  begins.  And  as  soon  as  we  start  to  think 
ecologically  about  the  tuatara’s  singularity  we  are  drawn  to  recognise  plurality,  its  being 
singular plural, and not its isolation. We are drawn to recognise the plurality of its existence 
with myriad others, some of which are so similar that they can hardly be told apart from an 
external “objective” position (can even tuataras tell the difference between members of their 
different species/populations?), some so very different that their worlds have little or nothing in 
common except the way that they touch each other so very, very, intimately.
66  
Yet  as  soon  as  we  think  ecologically  in  terms  of  plurality  we  are  also  drawn  to 
recognise singularity, whether in terms of the species or individuals. Like reptile ticks, that “use 
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course, even the tuatara too would probably suffer in such a comparison and its survival as a species may count 
for nothing at all in this limited and limiting frame of reference. 
64 As of 2010 a genetic study has argued that these two species are not actually sufficiently distinct to constitute 
separate species but are “best described as a single species that contains distinctive and important geographic 
variants.” (Jennifer M. Hay, Stephen D. Sarre, David M. Lambert, Fred W. Allendorf, and Charles H. Daugherty, 
“Genetic Diversity and Taxonomy: A Reassessment of Species Designation in Tuatara (Sphenodon: Reptilia),” 
Conservation Genetics 11, no. 3 (2010): 1063-1081 (1063)). Sphenodon guntheri, the Brother’s Island tuatara was 
found only on that island and is smaller than Sphenodon punctatus. 
65 The parietal eye third eye has many of the features of its other two eyes (a lens, nerve connection, retina and so 
on) although it is visible only in juveniles and now evolutionarily reduced to a light sensitive patch. 
66 Appearances can be deceptive in other ways too. Although “tuatara have remained largely unchanged physically 
over very long periods of evolution, they are evolving—at a DNA level—faster than any other animal yet 
examined.” Live Science (2012) http://www.livescience.com/2396-fastest-evolving-creature-living-dinosaur.html 
accessed 26/08/2012. 38 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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different  cues  for  host  seeking  than  [Uexküll’s  favoured]  mammal  and  bird  ticks”
67 
Amblyomma sphenodonti pr obabl y adopt s  “a ‘ s i t -and-wait’ host-seeking  strategy  within  the 
host  refuge”,
68 in  this  case,  the  tuatara’s  burrow.  In  any  case  Amblyomma s h o w s  a  s t r o n g  
preference for moist soil. (Tuatara and tick also share the burrow, they are commensal, with a 
species  of  seabird,  the  Fairy  Prion  (Pachyptila  turtur)  of  which  the  tick  may  be  entirely 
unaware.) Studies have yet to show whether Amblyomma can, like reptile ticks, “synchronise 
their detachment with times when hosts are in refuges, or with physiological cues that indicate 
the host is at rest”
69 abilities which may suggest a rather more complex sensory world than 
Uexküll credits them. The tuatara tick is also most active at night which may (or may not) 
reflect its host’s nocturnal habits. In this way we begin to picture its singular way of life, nestled 
and  closely  attached  within  the  folds  of  the  tuatara’s  skin.  Of c o u r s e ,  s u c h  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
singularity  may  (at  least  in  the  case  of  the  tuatara)  induce  the  kind  of  emotional  and 
anthropomorphising tendencies that Soulé abhors, but even if it does then this may actually 
play  a  much  larger  role  in  saving  the  tuatara  from e x t i n c t i o n  t h a n  s c i e n t i f i c  c o n s e r v a t i o n  
biology would like to admit. Take the following BBC report: 
 
A rare New Zealand reptile has become a father, possibly for the first time, at the age of 
111. The keepers of Henry, a tuatara, had thought he was past his prime—especially after 
showing no interest in females during 40 years in captivity. But he mated with 80-year-old 
Mildred last July and 11 of the eggs she produced have now hatched. Henry’s keepers have 
put his newfound vigour down to a recent operation to remove a tumour from his bottom 
… Henry arrived at Southland Museum in the South Island city of Invercargill in 1970 and, 
his keepers say, soon became overweight and idle. He was known for his foul temper and 
had  a  tendency  to  attack  other  tuatara—forcing  the  museum  to  keep  him  in  solitary 
confinement  for  many  years.  But  since  his  operation,  Museum  tuatara  curator  Lindsay 
Hazley said he had had a “major personality transplant”. “I have done lots of eggs before 
but these are just special because they are Henry’s,” Mr Hazley told the Southland Times. 
Tuatara,  which  are  found  only  in  New  Zealand,  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  “living 
fossils”. They are the only surviving members of a family [sic] of species which walked the 
Earth with the dinosaurs more than 200 million years ago. The museum now has about 70 
of the rare creatures, and Mr Hazley is hopeful that Henry might provide more offspring in 
the future. He lives with three female tuatara “in great harmony”, said Mr Hazley, and 
described the hatching of the eggs as “the completion of a love story”.
70  
 
Unfortunately, the article does not mention if the ecological community that is Henry, and also 
more than just Henry, includes ticks. But thinking ecologically makes it harder to simply except 
Henry, his species, or his “parasites” ethically and politically from community with us, because 
now  such  beings  at  least  appear  to  us,  are  recognised  as  having  certain  effects  which  go 
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67 Stephanie S. Godfrey, Nicola J. Nelson, and C. Michael Bull, “Microhabitat Choice and Host-Seeking Behaviour 
of the Tuatara Tick, Amblyomma sphenodonti (Acari: Ixodidae),” New Zealand Journal of Ecology 35, no. 1 (2011): 
52-60 (52). 
68 Godfrey, Nelson, and Bull, “Microhabitat choice,” 59. 
69 Ibid., 58. 
70 BBC News, “Reptile becomes a Father, at 111,” accessed 23 August 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7850975.stm Smith, Ecological Community / 39 
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beyond what we sense, obtain richer, different, and more complicated meanings, and can 
affect the way we “see” the world, a world in common from which we cannot be exempted for 
so long as we live. While thinking about extinction might bring to mind both our own, all too 
short residency, as somewhat singular beings in this world (after all, eternity is a limit we all 
have  to  our  being  in  common)  it  might  also  bring  to  mind  the  ecological  plurality  that 
precedes,  informs  and  may  (or  in  many  cases  may  not)  survive  us.  To  think  in  terms  of 
ecological community is to recognise “the sense of the world” in terms of such very different 
appearances, involvements, significances, and experiences.  
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